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Abstract 
This paper examines the political mechanisms of welfare state policymaking in two countries 
with differing levels of institutional and political constraints, Germany and Ireland. The study 
analyzes the joint impact of political constraints and varying party governments on different 
dimensions of labor market policymaking. It comes to the conclusion that left-wing 
governments must cut spending more to accommodate the conservative opposition and gain 
its support when political and institutional constraints are high. To simultaneously ensure the 
support from pivotal extra-parliamentary actors, namely labor unions that are closely linked 
to the governing party, the left has to further compensate the unions‘ prime constituency, 
which is the well-integrated core workforce. The privileged treatment of labor market 
‗insiders‘ by left-wing governments in countries with high political constraints comes at the 
expenses of labor market ‗outsiders‘. Left-wing party governments in countries where 
political constraints are low are better able to address the needs of broader segments of 
society. 
Zusammenfassung 
Diese Studie analysiert Arbeitsmarktreformen in Deutschland und Irland, zwei Ländern, 
welche unterschiedliche politische und institutionelle Zwänge aufweisen. Untersucht wird, 
wie sich der gemeinsame Effekt des institutionellen Gefüges und der Regierungsideologie 
auf die Gestaltung der Arbeitsmarktpolitik auswirkt. Die Fallstudien zeigen, dass linke 
Regierungen in Ländern mit hohen institutionellen Zwängen mehr Kosten einsparen müssen, 
um sich die Unterstützung der Oppositionsparteien zu sichern. Damit die Regierung die 
Unterstützung der Gewerkschaften nicht verliert, wird bei der Gestaltung der Reform 
besonders auf die Bedürfnisse der Kernarbeitnehmerschaft Rücksicht genommen. Die 
bevorzugte Behandlung von ‚Insidern‘ in Ländern mit hohen institutionellen Zwängen 
geschieht auf Kosten der Arbeitnehmer, welche nicht von einflussreichen Interessen-
organisationen vertreten werden (‚Outsider‘). In Ländern, wo linke Regierungen bei 
Reformen nicht auf die Unterstützung der Opposition angewiesen sind, hat die Regierung 
die Möglichkeit, die verbliebenen Resourcen auf unterschiedliche Segmente der 
Arbeitnehmerschaft zu verteilen. 
Keywords 
Party government, social policy reform, welfare state, redistribution, labor market ‗insider‘ 
and ‗outsider‘ 
Schlagwörter 
Parteienregierung, Arbeitsmarktreformen, Wohlfahrtsstaat, Umverteilung, Dualisierung des 
Arbeitsmarktes 
 General note on content 
The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author and not necessarily those of the IHS 
Department of Political Science 
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Introduction 
During the past decades, the challenges that mature welfare states are facing have 
increased significantly. Among these challenges that party governments in post-industrial 
countries are facing are high economic interdependence, fiscal austerity and the structural 
change of the economy. The combination of these developments affects the room to 
maneuver for political actors and have a strong impact on domestic labor markets. In 
addition, globalization and related phenomena also influence how different groups in society 
are affected by unemployment, atypical employment and other societal risks. Inequality 
among different groups of labor market participants has increased due to globalization and 
the aforementioned developments. This article, which is part of a larger project that 
combines macro-level evidence with subsequent case studies, examines the impact of party 
governments on labor market reforms and how labor market ‗insiders‘ and ‗outsiders‘ are 
affected by varying party governments.
1
 It addresses the question whether party 
governments still have room to shape policies according to their underlying party ideology 
and how labor market reforms are mediated by varying levels of political and institutional 
constraints.  
To examine how varying party governments affect different groups of labor market 
participants, I focus on labor market reforms. Labor markets in post-industrial economies are 
particularly vulnerable to the contemporary developments, and governments in post-
industrial democracies are under pressure to adjust social security schemes to meet the 
needs of workers in a more flexible environment. One of the characteristics of the most 
recent wave of globalization is the increasing dualization of the labor market and the 
unequally distributed risk to lose employment (e.g. Goldthorpe, 1984; Rueda, 2006; 
Blanchard, 2006; Lindbeck and Snower, 2001). Important elements of labor markets in post-
industrial economies are an increasing percentage of part-time and fixed-term employees, 
and a bigger share of women participating in the labor market. In order to address the 
challenges related to globalization, party governments are under pressure to reform social 
security schemes and labor market institutions. When reforming labor market policies and 
labor market institutions, the specific aspects that party governments emphasize greatly 
differ in scope and range. 
Unlike most scholars, this larger project examines the impact of party governments on two 
dimensions of social policy reforms, the expenditure dimension and a redistributive 
dimension. In addition, the theoretical framework makes clear predictions how varying levels 
of political constraints differently affect party governments with different ideological 
backgrounds. My argument implies that both left-wing and right-wing governments in 
                                                     
1
 The quantitative study includes the following mature welfare states: Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
France, Finland, Germany, Italy, Ireland, Japan, Netherland, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United 
States, United Kingdom and covers the period between 1971-2002. 
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countries with little institutional constraints cut social spending. However, when institutional 
constraints are high, left-wing governments must cut spending more to accommodate the 
conservative opposition and gain its support. To simultaneously ensure the support from 
pivotal extra-parliamentary actors, namely labor unions, the left has to further compensate 
the unions‘ prime constituency, which is the well-integrated core workforce. The 
compensation of these ‗insiders‘ through an increase of the redistributive generosity of social 
security schemes by left-wing governments therefore increases with greater institutional 
constraints. This increase in redistributive generosity beneficiary for the core workforce 
comes at the expenses of the poor and the increasing share of atypically employed people in 
post-industrial countries.  
In this paper, I examine this argument using case study research and empirically trace the 
above mentioned processes in two countries with varying political constraints, Germany and 
Ireland. The analysis of labor market reform processes in Germany and Ireland shows that 
institutional and political constraints have influenced leftist and conservative governments in 
different ways, and therefore also affected the content of the reform and the reform process 
as such. Each country study covers two reform processes affecting labor market and 
unemployment policies in the mid 1990s and early 2000. This paper thus adds to the debate 
on the role of party politics in welfare state policymaking and the reform of social policy 
schemes in industrialized Western European countries. 
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1. Theoretical Argument 
It is generally accepted that party governments face high reform pressure and thus have to 
focus on cutting social expenditures (e.g. Green-Pedersen, 2002; Pierson, 2001; Ross, 
1997; Starke, Obinger and Castles, 2008). Governments of both right- and left-wing 
partisanship are similarly affected by these economic and fiscal constraints. While the two 
differing party governments may vary with respect to their desired amount of spending, both 
must accept that actual expenditures have to be stabilized because the economic constraints 
do not leave room for alternative choices on this dimension.
2
 This implies that party 
governments converge on the expenditures dimension, but it is plausible that they still take 
different policy positions on how the remaining resources are distributed among particular 
societal groups. This would allow governments to compensate ‗losers‘ of retrenchment, in 
particular the so-called labor market ‗outsiders‘ or ‗working poor‘, by reforming social policies 
in a way that other, less affected groups carry a higher share of the reform.
3
 
Generally, cuts in social welfare measures affect the labor force and poor people most. 
Especially the well-organized core workforce (the so-called ‗insiders‘) will demand that the 
government offers protection from an increasing loss in social security. The focus on a single 
dimension, which implicitly underlies most research on welfare state reforms and change 
(e.g. by Kittel and Obinger, 2003; Huber and Stephens, 2001; Swank, 2005), thus neglects 
important aspects about the content of a reform (i.e. the size of compensation/changes 
within the redistributive dimension), and, more importantly, fails to capture important 
ideological differences among political actors. To concentrate on redistribution or the 
redistributive generosity of social policies as the second dimension of interest is justified by 
recent empirical evidence. Individuals demand more redistributive policies because they are 
increasingly exposed to economic risks (Rehm, 2009). Taking into account more dimensions 
than just expenditures therefore should yield different predictions about the role of party 
politics on welfare state reforms than the widely used one-dimensional conceptualization.  
This flexibility that governments have on a second social policy dimension is important when 
we analyze the role of parties across institutional settings. Although institutional analyses of 
social policymaking are very popular (e.g. Steinmo and Tolbert, 1998; Immergut, 1992; 
Crepaz and Moser, 2004; Obinger et al., 2005), they usually do not take into account how 
the role of parties differs across institutional settings.
4
 Whether or not a party government 
                                                     
2
 This assumption largely reflects the findings of the last decade (e.g. Castles, 1998; Huber and Stephens, 2001; 
Kittel and Obinger, 2003; Kwon and Pontusson, 2005). 
3
 Labor market ‗outsiders‘ largely consist of unskilled labor, long-term unemployed people relying on social 
assistance, people in public employment schemes, to some extent part-time workers and immigrants also belong to 
this category. These groups are often underrepresented by organized interests. 
4
 Two exceptions are Green-Pedersen (2002; 2001) and Bonoli (2001) who both offer a partial framework of 
contingent effects of particular party governments and the institutional framework for the politics of retrenchment. 
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has a significant impact on the further development of welfare states is not only contingent 
on the state of the economy and societal factors, but also depends on the institutional setting 
of a country.
5
 The presence or absence of institutional and political constraints in a country 
therefore enables or hinders parties in opposition and organized interests to pressure the 
incumbent to move closer towards their preferred policies. However, the constraining effect 
of institutions is likely to differ across parties in government. This means that institutions 
constrain left-wing governments differently from right-wing parties in power. Constraints in 
this paper are broadly defined as formal institutional constraints present in a country (such 
as a powerful second chamber of parliament or the federal organization of a country) and 
political constraints (such as powerful trade unions strongly vested with the social democratic 
party) that restrict governments in their capacity to implement their most preferred policy.
6
 
The effect of government change and the policies implemented therefore differ in high- and 
low-constraints countries. The following paragraphs first discuss the mediating effects of 
political constraints for both types of government. As I start from the assumption that different 
party governments must reduce or at least stabilize spending, the reform mechanisms 
principally work through the redistributive dimension. I expect that both, left- and right-wing 
governments implement retrenching elements in their reforms, but that significant differences 
exist with respect to the redistributive elements implemented depending on the countries 
institutional structure. Figure 1 and 2 summarize the theoretical argument presented in the 
following paragraphs.  
Left-wing governments in countries with little institutional and political constraints tend to 
implement welfare state reforms that stabilize overall spending, but at the same time 
compensate workers and people that are negatively affected by globalization and structural 
change by increasing transfers towards these groups. This is in line with recent empirical 
research, which shows that leftist governments aim at implementing more egalitarian policies 
and try to decrease inequality within society (see e.g. Brady and Leicht, 2008; Boix, 1998). 
For this reason, left-wing governments may be more successful than right-wing governments 
in implementing social policy reforms. When social democratic governments attempt to cut 
expenditures in times of fiscal constraints the affected segments of the electorate tend to 
‗trust‘ left-wing government more, i.e. workers assume that left-wing governments do not cut 
social spending more than necessary. By offering compensation for those who lose from 
retrenchment measures through greater redistribution, left-wing governments can also signal 
                                                     
5
 The importance of institutions for social policies is well established in comparative political economy (see e.g. 
Esping-Andersen, 1990; Steinmo and Tolbert, 1998; Ebbinghaus and Visser, 1998; Hall, 1997; Steinmo, 1989).  
6
 The presented framework comes closest to Immergut‘s (1990; 1992) notion of veto-points. It differs from Tsebelis‘ 
veto-player framework (1995; 1999) because the capacity to produce political change is not solely dependent on the 
political system but also on the partisanship of the incumbent. The mechanisms proposed in this paper also differ 
from ‗New Politics‘ literature, which is heavily based on institutionalist arguments. However, the factors crucial to 
Pierson‘s framework (2001; 1996; 1994) is the institutional stickiness of existing social security schemes that 
influence the further development and reforms (path-dependency). The formal institutional setting and party 
struggles are of limited importance.  
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their concern for the interests of the core workforce and the main ‗losers‘ of globalization, i.e. 
unskilled labor and people that are not part of the core work force. A left-wing government 
thus can gain politically even from a reform that includes retrenchment measures if it offers 
compensation through an increase of the redistributive generosity of the major social security 
schemes.  
Figure 1: Redistributive generosity mediated by political constraints – Implications for 
‘Insiders’ 
  Constraints 
  low high 
Government 
left medium large 
right low low 
 
When institutional and political constraints are large, the logic of the policymaking process 
for left-wing incumbents changes. Social democratic governments still receive greater 
potential support when reforming social policies, but they also have to accommodate 
conservative forces and must design the social policy reforms accordingly. For instance, the 
government may have to offer greater retrenchment to the conservative opposition to reach 
an agreement. More retrenching measures are against the interests of the core workforce, 
and labor unions will oppose such a reform and may take actions against such a plan. Labor 
unions can pressure the government through extra-parliamentary actions, such as 
demonstrations or strikes, or by activating union members that are also members of 
parliament.
7
 In addition to greater retrenchment, the government then has to offer more 
compensation to the constituencies of labor unions, which generally are skilled workers that 
are well-integrated into the working process, the so-called ‗insiders‘ (Rueda, 2005, 2007, 
2006). In other words, to achieve greater retrenchment, the left-wing government has to 
make sure that ‗insiders‘ are not affected too much by the reform. However, to increase the 
redistributive generosity for ‗insiders‘, the government cannot increase the tax burden of the 
wealthy because this would provoke the resistance of the right-wing/conservative opposition. 
                                                     
7
 As an example, during the 12th legislative period, over 70 percent of the social democratic members of the 
German parliament were also union members (1990–1994). This figure even increased to over 80 percent during 
the 14th legislative period (1999–2003). On the other side, the share of Christian democratic members of 
parliament, which were also members of a labor union decreased from 7.5 percent to 1 percent, between the 12th 
and the 14th legislative period, respectively (Trampusch, 2003, p. 92). 
6 — Hübscher / The Constrained Left and its Impact on Losers of Globalization — I H S 
 
A possible solution is a disproportionate retrenchment on the side of ‗outsiders‘, i.e. the 
unskilled without regular employment, to satisfy the needs of the well-integrated core 
workforce and, at the same time, achieve a sufficient reduction in social expenditures to 
accommodate the opposition.
8
 In contrast, in a political system with less constraints, a left-
wing government does not need to accommodate conservative parties. Moreover, the 
government may face less pressure from lobbying groups representing ‗insiders‘. This 
implies that in such a less constraining system left-wing party governments are able to 
propose and implement reforms that redistribute the available resources in a more 
egalitarian way. In such a system, the compensation measures are likely to be directed 
towards all segments of the labor force and not only towards the core social programs that 
mainly benefit the core workforce represented by powerful organized interest. In high 
constraints countries, we should see greater distribution towards ‗insiders‘, while in low 
constraints countries, we should see less redistribution that is particularly directed towards 
the well-integrated workforce. 
Figure 2: Redistributive generosity mediated by political constraints – implications for 
‘outsiders’ 
  Constraints 
  low high 
Government 
left large medium/low 
right low (low) 
 
Adapting the same logic to right-wing governments, we should expect that right-wing 
governments that face few institutional constraints tend to decrease spending without 
compensating the losers of the reform. It is widely acknowledged that right-wing 
governments – during the times of welfare state expansion and development – preferred less 
expansive social policies than social democratic governments. Similarly, in times of fiscal 
constraints, conservative governments still prefer less expansive policies because they 
intend to lower the tax burden for reforms and capital owners to increase economic growth. 
With regard to the second dimension, right-wing governments do not have much interest in 
                                                     
8
 ‗Outsiders‘, i.e. unskilled labor, long-term unemployed people relying on social assistance, people in public 
employment schemes, to some extent part-time workers and immigrants are often underrepresented by organized 
interests. 
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compensating particular groups in society, but mainly focus on retrenching policies. In 
countries with little institutional constraints and few or no access points for extra-
parliamentarian actors to the decision-making arena, right-wing governments can implement 
their preferred policy without the consideration of special interests. Conservative 
governments, which are constrained, tend to end up with social policy reforms that bring little 
change both in terms of retrenchment and redistributive generosity because of the pressure 
that interest groups – mainly labor unions and, for right-wing governments, employers‘ 
organizations – exert on the government. In order to implement the necessary retrenching 
measures, the government would have to compensate special interest groups in a society, 
mainly organized labor. Labor unions demand measures, which alleviate the effect of the 
retrenching measures of the reform on their constituencies. However, these measures are 
against the interest of employers‘ organizations that are close to the conservative party in 
power. The compensation of the core workforce, however, is not attractive for a right-wing 
government, because the political gains from such a strategy in electoral competition is 
small. Since social policy and welfare state issues are traditionally occupied by left-wing 
parties, conservative parties cannot credibly offer policy solutions that are similar to those of 
left-wing parties. The distributive effect of right-wing party governments in countries with high 
constraints therefore is low or at least remains unclear.
9
 
                                                     
9
 Recent empirical research by Jensen (2010) shows that right-wing governments tend to even spend more on 
social welfare because the public in general does not trust right-wing governments when it comes to social policies. 
However, this study does not examine the impact of conservative/right-wing governments on various segments of 
labor market participants. Empirically, the policy position and the impact of right-wing governments on labor market 
‗outsiders‘ remain unclear and should be subject for further research. 
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2. Research Design 
The selection of cases to empirically examine the theoretical argument and to trace the 
underlying processes follows a two-step procedure. First, I rely on the results of a preceding 
quantitative analysis (Hübscher, 2009). This analysis focused on the effect of left-party 
governments on social policies towards labor market ‗insiders‘ and largely confirms the 
hypothesized relationships. The study, however, largely ignores the role of labor market 
‗outsiders‘ in this process and does not verify whether the postulated mechanism in fact 
leads to these results. Following a nested analysis design (Lieberman, 2005), I choose 
countries that are well explained by the quantitative analysis to substantiate the theoretical 
mechanisms described in the previous section in a manifold way.
10
 First, I examine to what 
extent the policy positions of government parties in the two-dimensional social policy space 
are consistent with those underlying the theoretical discussion. Second, the case studies 
analyze the policymaking process of each reform in detail by focusing on the joint effect of 
institutions, political constraints and party governments on social policies vis-à-vis 
‗outsiders‘.
11
 
The second step in the case selection procedure is to select countries that show variation on 
the key independent variables (Geddes, 2003). Since I expect that the level of political 
constraints together with the party affiliation of the incumbent government affect the outcome 
of a reform, the countries included in the case study must have different levels of political 
constraints and varying party governments. Germany and Ireland both fulfill these criteria. In 
Germany, the level of political constraints is high because the formal institutional setting 
(federalism and a second chamber of parliament) allows opposition parties and lower-level 
state authorities to influence or block policy proposals. Moreover, influential interest groups 
have strong personal ties to political parties and can access the policymaking procedure in 
various ways (Trampusch, 2003; Streeck, 2003). The Irish political system, on the contrary, 
has little political constraints that inhibit the policymaking process (Chari and McMahon, 
2003; Connolly and O‘Halpin, 1999), e.g. Ireland is a unitarian state where regional 
authorities have very limited competences. Even though Ireland also has a bicameral 
system, the Seanad (the second parliamentary chamber) has little power in the legislative 
processes. Moreover the Taoiseach has the right to appoint eleven senators, which means 
that the governing coalition always has the majority in the Upper Chamber. 
Finally, I select two social policy reforms in each country, one that was implemented by a 
conservative government and another one by a left-wing government. For Germany, I will 
analyze the ‗Beschäftigungsförderungsgesetz‘ (employment promotion act) and the 
JobAQTIV law in 1994 and 2001, respectively. For Ireland, I choose the Financial and Social 
                                                     
10
 The results are available from the author. 
11
 The terms ‗change‘ and ‗impact‘ are understood in a qualitative manner and I will not measure the impact the 
examined reforms had on different groups using individual level or macro-economic indicators. 
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Welfare Bills in 1996 and 2001.
12
 The first reform in Germany was implemented by a 
conservative coalition government between the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and the 
Liberals (FDP) led by Helmut Kohl. The second reform was designed by the coalition 
government between the Social Democrats (SPD) and the Green Party under chancellor 
Gerhard Schröder. The Irish Financial and Social Welfare Bill of 1996 was presented by a 
left-wing coalition government consisting of Fine Gael, Labour and the Democratic Left 
(‗rainbow coalition‘). Despite the fact that the existence of the classical left-right dimension 
has been contested in the context of Ireland, the ‗rainbow coalition‘ can be labeled as left-
wing government because the Democratic left, which had a significant impact on the 
government‘s policymaking, corresponds to traditional left-wing parties present on the 
continent.
13
 In 2001, the reform was implemented by a conservative government consisting 
of Fianna Fàil and the Progressive Democrats. 
To empirically analyze the reform processes, I evaluate the content of parliamentary minutes 
and legislative documents.
14
 Unlike in Germany, where the reforms exclusively address 
unemployment and labor market issues, social policy issues affecting the labor market are 
not treated separately in a single legislative act in Ireland. Social policy issues are included 
in two major legislative bills, the Financial and Social Welfare Bills. I analyze the annual 
parliamentary discussions related to the Financial and the Social Welfare Bills in the Dàil 
Éirann (the Irish parliament). From these bills, I single out the relevant issues related to 
unemployment and labor market policymaking. 
The issues of interests are primarily changes that affect various aspects related to 
unemployment insurance schemes, such as eligibility, benefits and contributory issues but 
also reforms affecting the functioning of the labor market, such as the implementation of 
placement agencies or measures inducing more flexibility of the labor market. In addition to 
the parliamentary minutes, I also add evidence from committee hearings (for Germany) and 
newspapers (Ireland) to include the policy positions of the relevant extra parliamentarian 
actors.
15
 This is useful to substantiate the policy positions of the extra parliamentarian actors, 
mainly trade unions and employers‘ organizations, because the committee stage of the 
legislative process in Ireland has very little impact on the design of the draft and, unlike in 
                                                     
12
 Because the reforms analyzed in this study should be related as closely to the precedent quantitative analysis, I 
choose reforms that were designed and implemented before 2002. My quantitative analysis ends in 2002. 
13
 On the Irish party system and its particularities and similarities with continental European party systems (see e.g. 
Mair, 1987; Laver, 1992; Gilland Lutz, 2003). 
14
 The documents (parliamentary minutes, legislative proposals, and reports) for the German case studies are 
accessible online on http://dip.bundestag.de. The minutes of the committee hearings can be obtained from the 
parliamentary services. The parliamentary minutes of the Irish Dàil Éirann have been extracted from http://historical-
debates.oireachtas.ie/index.html. 
15
 The newspaper articles were selected from the Irish Times. The content of the Irish times is included in the 
LexisNexis data base. I used the following key words: unemployment, social welfare, labor market. I selected 
articles that were published up to two months before the respective bill was discussed in parliament and articles 
published during the period the bills were discussed in the Dàil. 
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Germany, the committee system is less institutionalized, and the committees varied over 
time. Besides the original positions of political parties and intentions of party governments at 
the outset of the reform, I analyze how the original reform plan changed during the 
policymaking process, and whether and how labor market ‗outsiders‘ and ‗insiders‘ are 
affected by the final bill that was approved by the legislature. In the subsequent empirical 
part, the core issues of the reforms are assigned to one of the two dimensions, redistributive 
generosity or spending, and summarized in tables 2 through 5 in the next two sections. 
Issues assigned to the redistributive dimension have in common that they affect the 
redistributive generosity of programs by altering benefits or contributions relative to an 
individual‘s income, and/or are directed towards specific groups (e.g. higher income groups). 
Issues attributed to the expenditure dimension either affect every individual equally (e.g. 
general cuts of benefits, cut in the duration of benefits) or aim at increasing the efficiency of 
the labor market by implementing active labor market policies and outsourcing services to 
private agencies (see table 1).
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Table 1: Reform Issues 
Redistributive Issues Expenditure Issues 
Issue Description Issue  Description 
Benefits Compared to 
Previous Income 
Unemployment insurance benefits often 
depend on previous earnings. The level of 
benefits sets the rate to which extent the 
original income will be replaced by 
unemployment benefits in case of job loss. 
This is a matter of redistribution if low 
incomes get a higher percentage of their 
previous income than individuals with a high 
previous income (or benefits for people in 
high income brackets are subject to a 
maximum benefit). 
Duration of Benefits 
Unemployed people are eligible for 
unemployment benefits during a certain 
period only. Shortening or extending the 
duration of benefits influences the 
expenditure dimension. 
Contributions Relative 
to Income 
The contributory rates can be different for 
employees given a particular income. A 
related issue is how the contributions are 
split between employee and employer and 
whether there are different contributory rates 
for different income levels. 
Public Funding 
Unemployment insurance schemes are 
mostly financed through contributions from 
employers and employees. However, a minor 
part of the insurance scheme is covered by 
the state and usually, the state also provides 
deficit guarantee. Higher/lower coverage by 
the state leads to more/less public 
expenditure. 
Eligibility 
The inclusion of new groups into the 
unemployment insurance scheme leads to a 
broader coverage of employees. Reforms 
can also exclude groups of employees (e.g. 
employees with salaries above or below a 
certain threshold, part-time employees, etc.). 
Eligibility is also related to the length of the 
necessary contributory period. 
Active Labor Market 
Policies (ALMP) 
Most labor market/unemployment insurance 
reforms nowadays include ALMP measures. 
Often, these policies aim at re-integrating 
unemployed people in the labor market more 
efficiently. The aim is to unburden the 
insurance scheme and ultimately to cut 
expenditures. Also included in this category is 
the establishment of (privately organized) 
regional placement centers with the aim of 
closer monitoring and lowering the costs of 
placing unemployed people. 
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3. Labor market reforms in Germany and Ireland 
3.1 Germany 
Employment Promotion Law 1994 (‘Beschäftigungsförderungsgesetz’) 
The ‘Beschäftigungsförderungsgesetz’ was one of the first legislations focusing on active 
labor market policies in Germany. The Bill was presented by the conservative 
CDU/CSU/FDP government, which aimed at addressing the persistently high unemployment 
and the rigidity of the German labor market. The following issues were included in the reform 
proposal: First, part-time jobs should be promoted by compensating employees when 
changing from a full-time to a part-time job or accepting a part-time job after being 
unemployed. Second, to increase self-employment and create jobs, the government offered 
additional six months of unemployment benefits for people who start their own business. 
Both measures were intended to be financed through the unemployment insurance scheme. 
Third, the maximum income of a person working in a public employment scheme (so-called 
‘Arbeitsbeschaffungsmaßnahmen’) should not exceed 80 percent of the salary a person in a 
regular work relationship would earn, and fourth, private placement centers were 
established. According to the theoretical framework presented in the previous section, the 
analysis should result in the overall conclusion that the privileges of the core workforce will 
be largely preserved and that ‗outsiders‘, such as contractors and part-time employees, did 
not significantly benefit from this reform. As table 2 indicates, most of the adjustments 
implemented by the conservative party government only minimally reduced the privileges of 
the core workforce. The redistributive generosity of the unemployment insurance scheme 
was hardly affected by the ‘Beschäftigungsförderungsgesetz’. However, due to the budgetary 
pressure, the reform as a whole had to be cost neutral, the least. This aim was mainly 
achieved by reducing the salaries for people working in public employment schemes, which 
compensated the additional costs caused by promoting part-time work and self-employment 
through unemployment insurance schemes. 
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Table 2: Reform Issues and Direction of Changes ‘Beschäftigungsförderungsgesetz’ 
 Effect on Dimension 
Reform Issue ‗Insiders‘ ‗Outsiders‘ Redistribution Expenditure 
Promotion of part-time work (3 
year top up if person takes a 
part-time job after being 
unemployed or changes from 
full-time to part-time 
employment) 
+ - X 
 
Start up help 
(‗Überbrückungsgeld‘), 
additional six months of 
unemployment benefits when 
starting a business 
+ - X  
Reducing the salaries for 
participants in public 
employment schemes 
+ -  X 
Private placement centers + Neutral  X 
 
Legend: + implicates that the implemented measure had a positive effect for the group 
indicated. – implicates that the reform negatively effects ‗insiders‘/‘outsiders‘. 
Several elements, such as the promotion of part-time jobs and self-employment should result 
in an increase in overall labor market participation. This aim was particularly accentuated by 
the liberal party (FDP). The need for more part-time jobs and the involvement of larger 
segments of society in the labor market was widely acknowledged by the parties in 
opposition. Yet, the manner how the government planned to increase labor market 
participation and part-time jobs was sharply criticized. Members of the social democrats and 
the Green party stressed that the envisaged aim of increasing the number of part-time jobs 
would in the end be at the expenses of the core workforce, which would increasingly need to 
give up social rights, which were often tied to regular employment relationships. To minimize 
the negative effects that the reform would have on the core workforce, the government 
offered to compensate employees with regular work arrangements and unemployed people, 
who change from a full-time to a part-time job. The compensation offered was a further 
payment of unemployment insurance benefits (over three years) to even out the difference 
between a full salary and a salary paid to a part-time employed person. 
The promotion of self-employment should also increase labor market participation, and in the 
long run even create additional jobs. Similarly to the governmental support of part-time jobs, 
unemployed people who decided to start their own business were offered compensation in 
the form of additional six months of unemployment insurance benefits. This capital should 
encourage entrepreneurial people and help them through the first months of their self-
employment. The main beneficiaries from this legislative change were the well-educated and 
skilled people (core workforce), who lost their job or decided to start something on their 
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own.
16
 People with little education and vocational training often do not have the expertise 
and know-how to launch a business or fail to be successful in the long run. Whereas German 
labor unions, together with the social democrats, asked for an extension of the planned six 
months assistance, the employer‘s organizations opposed this part of the legislation because 
‘the allocation of financial means for start-up firms and to encourage self-employment is not 
a core task of the unemployment insurance scheme and their contributors’, (written 
statement to the ‘Ausschuss für Arbeit und Soziales’).
17
 Overall, the efforts by the 
government to reduce costs and increase labor market participation hardly affected ‗insiders‘ 
negatively. Their privileges and the redistributive generosity of the unemployment insurance 
scheme were preserved and some of the changes even improved their standing in the labor 
market, e.g. the immediate eligibility to participate in training and qualification measures after 
losing the job certainly helps unemployed people to improve and adapt their skills, what 
makes it more attractive to hire them. 
The legislative proposal did not include measures, which were exclusively targeted labor 
market ‗outsiders‘. On the contrary, the decision to cut salaries paid to people working in 
public employment schemes in order to finance the promotion of part-time jobs and to 
increase labor market participation had a negative effect on these groups of society. The 
salary cuts were framed as ‘increasing the incentives for people working in the so-called ‘2nd 
labor market’ to re-integrate themselves in the competitive first labor market’ 
(Gesetzesentwurf , 17.05.1994, p. 9, Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht – Ausschuss für 
Arbeit und Sozialordnung, 13.04.1994, p. 27) by the government. The parties in opposition 
strongly opposed this change. The social democrats accused the government to ‘suspend 
tariff autonomy and to establish low-wage jobs by law [...]’, (Renate Jaeger, SPD, 
parliamentary minutes, 14.04.1994, p. 18944). The 20 percent cuts in salary finally 
established must be seen as a compromise, because the employer‘s organization pressured 
the government to cut salaries by 50 percent and even criticized the governing coalition that 
it would not exploit its room to maneuver (written statement to the ‘Ausschuss für Arbeit und 
Soziales’ by the DIHT). 
The private placement centers should help to decrease public expenditure and pressure the 
public job agencies to work more efficiently. It was also expected that the private job 
agencies will be better able to establish close ties with business and therefore be more 
successful in placing unemployed people as fast as possible. Though the service was open 
to everyone, the opposition argued that ‘unemployed people which are hard to place will be 
left behind, depending on the public placement centers, whereas unemployed with more 
                                                     
16
 Evidence from more recent start-up programmes show that only a small percentage of needy people start their 
own business (Wolff and Nivorozhkin, 2008) and though these self-employment programmes of the German 
government have been positively evaluated, studies show that a large percentage of the recipients are male and 
have qualifications and skills above average (Caliendo et al., 2007). 
17
 All translations by the author. 
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options will be placed through private centers’, (parliamentary minutes, 14.04.1994, p. 
18936). Therefore, the main beneficiaries will be skilled and well-educated people who lost 
their job. 
Mediating Effects of Political Constraints 
At the time when the ‘Beschäftigungsförderungsgesetz’ was debated in the two chambers, 
the conservative government was constrained by a majority of the opposition in the 
‘Bundesrat’ (second chamber of parliament), which is the most important veto player in the 
legislative process and consists of the representatives of the federal states. The SPD-led 
opposition was represented by 9 SPD members as opposed to 7 for the conservative parties 
in government. The initial bill as proposed by the government was heavily criticized by the 
SPD, the Green Party and the PDS/Linke Liste in the ‘Bundestag’ and would not have 
passed the SPD-dominated second chamber of parliament. However, there was 
disagreement whether the law needed the approval by the second chamber of parliament to 
pass in the first place. Whereas the government parties claimed that the reform proposal did 
not need the approval by the second chamber, the opposition parties insisted that the 
legislative proposal included changes, which concern the competences of the states and 
thus requires the approval by the second chamber of parliament. Oskar Lafontaine (SPD), 
prime minister of Saarland and leader of the social democratic party, denied the support for 
reform proposal. Consequentially, the bill was rejected by the left-wing majority. 
After the defeat in the second chamber of parliament, the ‘Ausschuss für Arbeit und Soziales’ 
in the ‘Bundestag’ quickly redrafted the reform and eliminated the paragraphs falling under 
the competence of the states. The disputed issues were integrated into a separate reform 
plan and postponed to be implemented at a later point. This strategic move allowed the 
coalition government to circumvent the second chamber of parliament and prevented a 
blockade of the reform process. Although the SPD-led ‘Bundesländer’ and the opposition 
parties in the parliament opposed this strategic maneuver, their hands were tied and the 
reform was finally approved after the fourth reading of the bill in the parliament. Because of 
the intervention by the parties in opposition in the second chamber of parliament, the reform 
as a whole did not dismantle the unemployment insurance scheme as such, e.g. it did not 
alter the contribution scheme or the entitlements for regularly unemployed people and 
therefore affected the core of the redistributive scheme in minor parts only. One reason why 
the government coalition between the CDU/CSU and the FPD was not able to draft and 
propose a reform with a more radical impact on the redistributive scheme was the lack of 
support for the government‘s proposal in the second chamber of parliament. The 
implementation of the ‘Beschäftigungsförderungsgesetz’ by the conservative government 
shows that a more retrenching reform at the expense of the core workforce was politically 
not possible, mainly because the political constraints that the government faced in the 
second chamber was too large. 
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The political cleavages in the debates of this reform process correspond to the assumption 
made in the theoretical section. The government was under great pressure to reform the 
labor market in order to stabilize the social insurance scheme and ameliorate the general 
conditions on the labor market. The main issues included in the ‗Beschäftigungsförderungs-
gesetz’ aimed at cutting expenditures for labor market policies and reducing the redistributive 
and encompassing effect of labor market policies. Most measures, however, indirectly 
affected unemployed people negatively and made it more difficult for people with little 
education and professional skills to find a new job.
18
 In the end, the reform only offered 
superficial solutions to a more complex problem, which was the rigidity of the German labor 
market and the ongoing structural change of the German economy. However, due to the 
partisan constellations in the important policymaking bodies, a more encompassing reform 
was not possible. 
‘Gesetz zur Reform der Arbeitsmarktpolitischen Instrumente 2001’ (Job-
AQTIV) 
Similar to the preceding conservative government, the coalition between the Social 
Democrats and the Green party also experienced significant reform pressure because of 
high unemployment figures and a high budgetary deficit. The reform of the labor market and 
a significant decrease in unemployment thus were central issues of the social-democratic 
election campaign and also a cornerstone of the subsequent coalition treaty. Table 3 
summarizes the major reform issues associated with the ‗Job-AQTIV‘ legislation. The 
overarching goal of the ‗Job-AQTIV‘ reform was to lower the duration of unemployment by 
increasing labor market flexibility through more vocational training and education measures 
for people in and out of employment.
19
 In addition, the reform also aimed at increasing the 
efficiency of the job placement centers by establishing improved reintegration procedures for 
unemployed people. 
  
                                                     
18
 Gregor Gysi (PDS/Linke Liste): ‘I do not criticize the fact that the government aims at cutting expenditure or to 
open up new sources of income, I criticize that this reform is mainly at the expenses of the weakest members of our 
society while the wealthy are always treated with care’, (see parliamentary minutes, 14.04.1994, p. 18935). 
19
 The name of the reform AQTIV is an abbreviation that summarizes the main goals of the legislative proposal: A = 
Aktivierung (activation), Q = Qualifizierung (qualification), T = Trainieren (training), I = Investieren (investment), V = 
Vermitteln (brokerage/improved placement). 
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Table 3: Reform Issues and Direction of Changes ‘Job-AQTIV 2001’ 
 Effect on Dimension 
Reform Issue ‗Insiders‘ ‗Outsiders‘ Redistribution Expenditure 
Secure work for specific 
groups (elderly/young people) 
by offering them the 
opportunity to participate in 
training measures 
+ +/- X  
Job-rotation scheme 
(unemployed person – 
temporarily – takes the job of a 
person that participates in 
qualifying measures 
+ + X X 
Subsidies for employers/firms if 
temporarily employing long-
term unemployed people 
- +  X 
Implementation of degressive 
elements to the unemployment 
assistance scheme (if person 
declines a job, declines to 
participate in additional 
vocational training) 
Neutral -  X 
Increase of the maximum 
period temporary employment 
(‗Leiharbeit‘) is allowed 
+/- +/-  X 
 
Overall, the ‗Job-AQTIV‘ legislation reflects the general direction of labor market 
policymaking under a leftist government as outlined by my theoretical argument. The 
government aimed at re-activating unemployed people, reintegrate labor market ‗outsiders‘ 
and employees and help labor market participants with an increased probability to lose 
employment (mainly elderly employees). The new policies were also meant to focus on 
integrating women and people with lower skills and little education, which contrasts 
traditional labor market policies in Germany, which were mainly directed towards the core 
work force, i.e. the unionized and skilled male population. Though efforts were made, the 
‗Job-AQTIV‘ legislation did not address these issues very successfully, a fact that was 
harshly criticized by the parties in opposition. According to the theoretical framework we 
should come to the conclusion that the reform will make a strong effort in cutting expenditure 
without significantly helping labor market ‗outsiders‘ and largely preserving the privileges of 
the core workforce. 
The most important issue included in the ‗Job-AQTIV‘ legislation was the so-called ‗job-
rotation‘ scheme. This scheme should, on the one hand, help elderly and young people to 
acquire further skills, which should secure their employment status and increase their 
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competitiveness. On the other hand, long-term unemployed people should get the chance to 
participate in ‗on the job training‘, while temporarily taking over the position of a regular 
employee who participates in training measures. Firms participating in the job-rotation 
scheme will be subsidized by the government. Another measure designed to increase overall 
labor market participation was to extend the period temporary employment is allowed. In 
addition, private placement centers should increasingly engage in ‗profiling‘ unemployed 
people and help them to find an adequate job. 
The prime intention of the job-rotation scheme was to help both people with regular work 
arrangements, which are most exposed to the risk of losing their job (young and elderly 
employees) and labor market ‗outsiders‘, which should be re-integrated. Criticism evolved 
around the government‘s proposition how the additional vocational training should be 
financed. The intention of the government was to finance the qualifying measures through 
the unemployment insurance scheme. Even though the peak labor union (DGB) agreed that 
additional training was needed, they disapproved the idea to finance the measure through 
the unemployment insurance scheme. Labor unions would have preferred if costs related to 
the ‗job-rotation‘ scheme would be paid through the tax system (statement by Ursula 
Engelen-Kefer (DGB) to the ‘Ausschuss für Arbeit und Soziales’ 10.10.2001, p. 9). To pass 
on the costs associated with this legislative change to the general taxpayer would again be 
beneficiary for labor market ‗insiders‘ since financing training measures is not the key task of 
unemployment insurance schemes and additional costs imposed on the scheme increase 
the pressure to adjust benefits paid to people covered by the scheme. Similar to the labor 
unions, the employer‘s organization also opposed the way the scheme should be financed. 
However, in line with their general policy preferences, the additional qualification measures 
should not be financed by employers and employees but be based on the principle of self-
responsibility (minutes ‘Auschuss für Arbeit und Soziales’ 10.10.2001, p. 3). The impact of 
the ‗job-rotation‘ scheme for labor market ‗outsiders‘ is mixed. On the one hand, labor market 
‗outsiders‘ are given the chance to be integrated in a regular working environment, on the 
other hand, the period is strictly limited and there is no guarantee that the person finds a 
follow-up job.
20
 
Bridging the gap between long-term unemployed people and people in the first labor market 
was seen as a necessity by all parties. The job-rotation scheme, however, was criticized as 
‘inflating the bureaucracy in the job placement centers’ (FDP, CDU/CSU and peak-
employer‘s organization). The FDP also stressed that small and medium firms will fear the 
costs to participate in the scheme. To combine the further education of targeted groups with 
the (re)-integration of ‗outsiders‘ was also criticized, because job-rotation should only be an 
instrument to re-integrate people and not offering (additional) qualification measures for 
‗insiders‘. In the view of the employer‘s representatives, the legislation as proposed by the 
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 The +/- in the table summarizing the impact of the implemented measures for labor market ‗insiders‘ and 
‗outsiders‘ implicates the ambivalent impact of the job-rotation scheme for labor market ‗outsiders‘. 
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government put too much emphasis on training measures.
21
 Rather than activating the labor 
market through the job-rotation scheme, the opposition would have preferred a more 
encompassing and drastic reform of the labor market, including severe cuts in 
unemployment benefits and contributions. Especially the liberal party argued that job security 
would increase with the further deregulation of the whole labor market and lower costs 
associated with employment (Irmgard Schwaetzer, FDP: ‘Why doesn’t the government 
acknowledge that for most employees a decrease of their salary would be better than losing 
their job entirely?’, parliamentary minutes, 27.09.2001, p. 18519). 
The controversially discussed extension of temporary employment (‘Leiharbeit’) should 
increase labor market participation and especially help people employed in low-wage sectors 
keeping their job. The plan to include workers with temporary contracts in the job-rotation 
scheme was sharply criticized by labor unions and the PDS/Die Linke. Both, the leftist 
political party and the labor unions were generally skeptical regarding temporary 
employment, mainly due to the fact that temporary contract would undermine wage 
bargaining autonomy and boost the low-wage sector. To include temporary employed people 
in the job-rotation scheme was seen as a subsidy for the contracting agencies and part of 
the labor unions (e.g. IG-Metall) feared that instead of securing employment for elderly 
workers, the inclusion of contractors would in the end crowed out the elderly skilled labor 
(see ‘Ausschuss für Arbeit und Sozialordnung’, 10.10.2001, p. 17). 
Though the ‗Job-AQTIV‘ legislation included several attempts to re-integrate ‗outsiders‘ of the 
labor market, these attempts on the redistributive dimension directed at ‗outsiders‘ were 
moderated by the rather huge concessions made towards the ‗insiders‘. This happened 
mainly through the promotion of additional professional training – financed through the 
unemployment insurance scheme – for (elderly) employees in regular employment. Similar 
to the ‘Beschäftigungsförderungsgesetz’, retrenchment should not happen through cuts in 
benefits but through increased efficiency in the placement of the unemployed. Even though 
the parties in opposition called for a more encompassing reform with a more retrenching 
effect on the social insurance schemes (especially the combination of the unemployment 
assistance and social assistance scheme), the governing coalition did not include these 
suggestions.
22
 
                                                     
21
 ‘We have to make it very clear that the ‘job-rotation-scheme’ has to enhance the chances for unemployed people 
on the labor market and should not be used for targeted training measures beneficiary to employees’, (written 
statement to the ‘Ausschuss für Arbeit und Sozialordnung’, p. 5). 
22
 It can be argued that since the government was under pressure to cut expenditure, it might have tried to impose 
more financial burden to the sub-national units, e.g. shortening the period of unemployment insurance benefits are 
paid, often lead to an increase in social assistance payments. Social assistance however, is administrated through 
the ‗Länder‘ and therefore a change would have needed the support of the ‗Länderkammer‘. 
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Mediating Effects of Political Constraints 
The content as well as the timing of the ‗Job-AQTIV‘ legislation was influenced by several 
types of constraints. First, the government had to signal to the electorate that the 
announcements made during the electoral campaign in 1998 to reform the labor market and 
to significantly decrease the level of unemployment were not only empty promises. However, 
the reason why the government was reluctant to engage in reform activities earlier – 
especially to propose reforms that significantly affected the redistributive generosity towards 
‗insiders‘ – was motivated by the fear that the labor unions would withdraw from the ‘Bündnis 
für Arbeit, Ausbildung und Wettbewerbsfähigkeit‘ (Alliance for Jobs). The cautious design of 
the reform and the fact that the government was very considerate towards the needs of the 
labor unions led to criticism by the parties in opposition. Irmgard Schwaetzer (FDP), for 
example, urged the government to ‘wake up’ and to ‘end the flirtatious relationship with the 
labor unions, which is having a catastrophic impact on the unemployed’, (parliamentary 
minutes, 27.09.2001, p. 18519). Second, the fact that the second chamber of parliament was 
dominated by the opposition parties had an important impact on the original reform plans. As 
Manow and Burkhart (2007) show, in situations were governments are divided, the 
incumbent anticipate the veto of the second chamber and draft the reform proposals 
accordingly, e.g. restrain themselves in order to avoid the blockage of legislative processes. 
According to the theoretical argument, reforms by a leftist government that is constraint by 
the institutional setting and its close ties to labor unions should lead in disproportional 
retrenchment on the back of labor market ‗outsiders‘ and preferential treatment of labor 
market ‗insiders‘. The empirical evidence presented in the previous paragraphs largely 
confirms these expectations. Even though the government should have cut expenditure 
more (according to the opposition parties), the main cuts implemented only affected people 
living from unemployment assistance. Regular unemployment insurance benefits, which are 
directed towards ‗insiders‘, were not affected by these cuts. An attempt to cut the latter 
benefits would have resulted in a loss of political support from labor unions and their 
representatives in parliament. Other measures, such as the job-rotation scheme, which was 
expected to reduce expenditure also worked in favor of labor market ‗insiders‘. The 
extension of temporary employment had a negative effect on labor market ‗outsiders‘. 
Empirical evidence shows that employees with fixed-term contract earn significantly less and 
have difficulties to find a regular job (e.g. Gash, 2008; Giesecke and Gross, 2003).
23
 
The legislative change brought by the ‗Job-AQTIV‘ law is an important landmark in German 
labor market policymaking and already included many aspects of the subsequent series of 
reforms known as ‗Hartz-reforms‘ (see e.g. Leschke, Schmid and Griga, 2006; Fleckenstein, 
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 Research by Giesecke and Gross (2003) shows that temporary employees risk to end up in a ‗chain of temporary‘ 
jobs and have difficulties finding regular employment. Long sequences of temporary employment deprive individuals 
from social rights and may lead to social exclusion. 
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2006; Berthold and von Berchem, 2003).
24
 The Job-AQTIV legislation was a first shift away 
from a passive system of guaranteeing income security and the commitment to maintain the 
standards of living towards a more active labor market policy, which aimed at activating the 
unemployed and increasing the flexibility of the rigid German labor market. Though the 
Hartz-legislations also included cuts in benefits for the core workforce and reduced the 
duration unemployment benefit is paid, many of the measures that should open up the labor 
market and decrease the shadow economy, mainly had a negative effect on unskilled labor, 
this is also supported by Martin and Thelen (2007, p.34), who conclude that the Hartz 
reforms deepened the divide between labor market ‗insiders‘ and ‗outsiders‘.
25
 The mini- and 
midi-job schemes, for example, do not offer full social insurance coverage and therefore 
predominantly reduced the entitlements for ‗outsiders‘.
26
 
4.2 Ireland 
Financial and Social Welfare Act 1996 
In 1996, the Irish cabinet consisted of a three party coalition between Fine Gael, Labour and 
the Democratic Left. The Democratic Left was represented with one minister only, De Rossa, 
who was the party leader and served as Minister for Social Welfare within the coalition. The 
social policy reforms presented by the center-left government primarily aimed at addressing 
the needs of the very poor, or ‗outsiders‘. De Rossa, characterized the bill as the ‘first 
integrated approach to address the most pressing social and economic problem, long-term 
unemployment’, (parliamentary minutes, 12.03.1996). Even though the Irish economy was 
booming, long-term unemployment and social inequality was a major problem of the Irish 
economy. The minister for Social Welfare justified the measures proposed in the budget and 
the welfare act that ‘they are intended to give particular help to our unacceptably large 
number of people who are long-term unemployed because this group is not benefiting 
enough from the current dynamic growth in employment’, (parliamentary minutes, 
23.01.1996).
27
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 The Hartz reforms further promoted instruments such as the ‗self-employment‘ scheme (known as ‗Ich-AG‘), 
tightened and further enforced the ‗capability to work‘ definition and put more emphasis on personnel service 
agencies (temporary job agencies), to name a few. Already discussed during the preparation phase of the Job-
AQTIV legislation but only implemented in the course of Hartz IV was the merger of unemployment assistance and 
social assistance into a single means-tested scheme (see Konle-Seidl, Eichhorst and Grienberger-Zingerle, 2007, 
for an overview over the changes implemented by Hartz I-IV). 
25
 According to Kemmerling and Bruttel (2006, p. 106), the retrenchment generated by the Hartz legislations are not 
substantive given the size of the German welfare state. 
26
 Mini- and midi-jobs are best suited for people – mainly married women – who are insured through their partner 
and/or are looking for a part-time job, such as students and people in retirement (see e.g. Leschke, Schmid and 
Griga, 2006; Konle-Seidl, Eichhorst and Grienberger-Zingerle, 2007). 
27
 During the parliamentary debate, members of the coalition also emphasized that the social needs of ‗outsiders‘ 
should finally be addressed, e.g. Joe Costello (Labour Party) stated that ‘this is the first time the long-term 
unemployment problem has been the main focus of a budget’, and Liz McManus (Democratic Left) pointed out the 
failures of previous governments to help the poor: ‘For decades, social and economic policy has failed to address 
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The overview in table 4 already shows that the majority of the issues affected the 
expenditure dimension and was mostly targeted at labor market ‗outsiders‘. In addition, both, 
‗insiders‘ and ‗outsiders‘ benefited from an overall increase in redistributive generosity. 
Several issues related to the PRSI scheme (PRSI = payment related social insurance 
scheme), should lead to an increase in the take home pay of employees belonging to the 
low-income bracket, e.g. by exempting the first $80 from the payments to the PRSI scheme) 
while simultaneously securing the funding of the scheme by increasing the contributory 
ceiling. 
Table 4: Reform Issues and Direction of Changes for ‘Financial and Social Welfare Bill 1996’ 
 Effect on Dimension 
Reform Issue ‗Insiders‘ ‗Outsiders‘ Redistribution Expenditure 
Increase of contributory ceiling 
of core social welfare 
programs (PRSI) 
+ - X  
Exemption of the first 
£80/weekly income from 
payments to core social 
security programs (PRSI) 
+ - X  
£80 recruitment subsidy for 
employers when hiring long-
term unemployed person 
Neutral +  X 
Implementation of community 
employment schemes 
Neutral +  X 
Compensation of long-term 
unemployed for taking low-
wage or part-time job 
- + X  
 
Fianna Fàil, the main party in opposition, together with the neo-liberal Progressive 
Democrats criticized the exclusive focus on the poor and people working in atypical 
employment relationships while ignoring the needs of middle- and high-income workers. 
Michael Dowell from the Progressive Democrats, for example, criticized that ‘[...] the 
government has shifted the burden of PRSI from the lower paid to the top of the structure’, 
(parliamentary minutes, 23.01.1996). Measures related to the promotion of part-time work 
(e.g. subsidies for employers) were less contested than the shifts affecting the redistributive 
dimension of the PRSI scheme. 
The 1996 Social Welfare and Financial Bill also included considerable changes on the 
expenditure dimension. Other than in Germany, the changes implemented by the ‗rainbow 
                                                                                                                                                      
the needs of two groups in society, those without work and those in low paid jobs’, (both quotes: parliamentary 
minutes, 31.01.1996). 
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coalition‘ increased public expenditure and expanded spending on social welfare issues. This 
was possible because the Irish economy was booming and tax incomes increased during the 
1990s. Even though all parties agreed that long-term unemployment was a serious problem 
of the Irish economy, many measures proposed by the ‗rainbow coalition‘ were opposed by 
the conservative parties. Critical voices regarding the help for long-term unemployed were 
also raised by some exponents of Labour, which was part of the coalition government. They 
were concerned that the subsidies for employers who hire long-term unemployed people 
would harm employees with regular working relationships. Roising Shortall (Labour Party) 
basically echoed the objections of the peak labor union (ICTU) by saying ‘we need to be 
extremely careful to ensure that proper guidelines are in place to safeguard against its [the 
implementation of the recruitment subsidy] resulting in the displacement of existing workers 
by long-term unemployed people – on the back of a subsidy such as this – with the potential 
of benefiting employers only’, (parliamentary minutes, 01.02.1996).
28
 The Progressive 
Democrats did not support the strategy of the government to increase labor market 
participation and lower long-term unemployment. According to Mairin Quill ‘the key to 
ensuring competitiveness is a reduction in costs for industry. In particular we must seek to 
reduce the cost of employing people. That means substantial cuts in personal taxation and 
PRSI both for employees and employers’, (parliamentary minutes, 30.01.1994). Overall, the 
conservative opposition would have preferred tax reductions and a substantial reform of the 
taxation system over the measures directed at the very poor. They expected that the 
government takes advantage of the booming economy, which would have allowed to 
implementing tax cuts. 
Mediating Effects of Political Constraints 
Irish governments – together with the peak labor and employers‘ organizations – negotiated 
three-year macro-economic programs, which set the lines for broader macro-economic 
policies and, more importantly, laid the ground for the development of the industrial wages. 
The annual Social Welfare Bill and the Financial Bill need to be in agreement with these 
broader principles defined within the program. However, the final design of the proposals and 
reforms is in the hands of the respective government. Interest organizations have only 
limited access to the actual legislative policymaking process. Thus, there is only little direct in 
influence of interest groups on the Financial Bill and the Social Welfare Bills. In the Bill 
presented in 1996, the strong role of the Democratic Left in the government is evident. Even 
though the Democratic Left only had one government seat (De Rossa), De Rossa and the 
Democratic Left was – according to Mary Harney (leader of the Progressive Democrats) – 
‘running the show’ and considerably pulled the incumbent ‗rainbow coalition‘ towards the left 
on the social policy dimension. John O‘Donoghue (Fianna Fàil) even claimed that ‘in 
                                                     
28
 The ICTU (Irish Congress of Trade Unions) was also worried that the Budget and the Social Welfare Bill will 
neglect the interests of PAYE workers, i.e. employees in a regular working relationship who contribute to the PRSI 
fund (‗The Irish Times‘, January 24, 1996). 
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delivering the Budget Statement, the Minister for Finance, Deputy Quinn, showed all the 
sincerity of a hostage speaking at gun point. When the Minister for Social Welfare, Deputy 
De Rossa, demanded a political ransom from the Government, it decided to pay, and the 
Minister, Deputy Quinn, was sent out to read the terms of surrender. The Minister, Deputy De 
Rossa, is the real Taoiseach’, (parliamentary minutes, 25.01.1996). Bertie Ahern (Fianna 
Fàil) also complained that ‘economic policy has been hijacked by Labour and the Democratic 
Left, a party with one percent of national support’, (parliamentary minutes, 23.01.1996). 
With little political and institutional constraints and a marginalized Fine Gael within the 
‗rainbow coalition‘, the left-wing government was able to design the Social Welfare Bill in a 
way that it addressed the needs of those societal groups that were generally neglected, 
specifically the long-term unemployed people and other groups that are not represented by 
trade unions and other interest organizations. This focus on labor market ‗outsiders‘ was not 
appreciated by the center-right parties who accused Labour that ‘it has deserted the trade 
union movement again. The PAYE workers, the trade union members and the small 
entrepreneurs have been let down by this government’, (Bertie Ahern, parliamentary 
minutes, 17.04.1996). These political processes and social policy outcomes of the 1996 
Social Welfare Bill confirm that unconstrained left-wing party governments are willing and 
able to implement policies that are beneficiary to societal groups who are generally 
underrepresented in political systems and often left behind. After many years of center and 
center-right governments, the parliamentary discourses and media coverage also documents 
how unusual the government‘s emphasis in social policymaking on the poorly organized 
‗outsiders‘ in Ireland was. It was possible only because the left-wing government did not 
have to find a compromise with the center parties. 
Financial and Social Welfare Act 2001 
In 2001, Fianna Fàil was governing together with the Progressive Democrats. Nominally, the 
Progressive Democrats were fairly weak, but just as for the Democratic Left in the previous 
government, their influence on the policy agenda was strong. Mary Harney, the party leader, 
was appointed as deputy prime-minister (Tanaìste) and in charge of the important Ministry of 
Enterprise, Trade and Employment. Despite the strong rhetoric used by Dermot Ahern, the 
Minister for Social, Community and Family Affairs, the shifts in the Irish social welfare system 
were less pronounced and comprehensive than in the previous Bills implemented by the left-
wing government. In 2001, he opened the second reading of the Bill by claiming that ‘we 
have turned around our social welfare system from one that simply compensates people for 
economic failure to one that helps people to help themselves’ (Dermot Ahern, Fianna Fàil, 
parliamentary minutes, 21.02.2001). 
As the overview in table 5 indicates, and as we would expect based on the theoretical 
framework presented in the previous section, the focus of the Social Welfare Bills presented 
by the Fianna Fàil-Progressive Democrats government perfectly mirrors the different 
I H S — Hübscher / The Constrained Left and its Impact on Losers of Globalization — 25 
approach of the governments towards social policies. The Budget and Social Welfare Bill by 
this liberal-conservative coalition did not include specific measures targeting at unemployed 
people, and the government did not implement any encompassing new programs or policies. 
This was not only the case during the incumbency of the conservative government after 
1997, but also during the period preceding the leftist ‗rainbow coalition‘ when unemployment 
was still high and the Irish economy was not performing well. The main focus of the Fianna 
Fàil/Progressive Democrats government was a reform of the Irish tax system and to reduce 
income taxes. Mary Harney (Progressive Democrats) characterized the government‘s 
program as following: ‘this government is committed to cutting tax rates [...], if low tax works 
for corporations, it works for the workers who work in those corporations’, (parliamentary 
minutes, 07.12.2001). 
Table 5: Reform Issues and Direction of Changes for ‘Financial and Social Welfare Bill 2001’ 
 Effect on Dimension 
Reform Issue ‗Insiders‘ ‗Outsiders‘ Redistribution Expenditure 
Tax cuts for higher income 
brackets 
+ - X  
Increase of PRSI ceiling +/- Neutral X  
Reduction of contribution rate 
(for regular employees) 
+ Neutral X  
Minimal increase of social 
welfare benefits (adjustment to 
annual inflation) 
+ - X X 
Abolition of PRSI contributory 
ceiling for employers 
Neutral Neutral  X 
Reduction of social insurance 
contributions for self-employed 
Neutral Neutral  X 
 
In general, the two bills reinforced the orthodox and neo-liberal economic policies of the 
Fianna Fàil/Progressive Democrats Government and – according to Joe Higgings (Socialist 
Party) – will ‘result in an increasing polarization between the super rich and the very highly 
paid on the one hand, and the poor and low middle income earners, on the other hand’, 
(parliamentary minutes, 28.02.2001). The set of policies that can be attributed to the 
redistributive dimension is dominated by changes affecting the taxation of income, with an 
emphasis on tax cuts privileging people in higher income brackets and business owners. 
Though tax cuts for business and companies were considerable, IBEC (Irish Business and 
Employers Confederation) opposed the abolishment of the PRSI contributory ceiling, mainly 
they feared a loss of overall economic competitiveness (‗The Irish Times‘, December 7, 
2001). 
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The changes that altered the redistributive characteristic of genuine social policies (such as 
the contributory and benefit schemes) were bound to the standard increase in the 
employees‘ PRSI ceiling and a very limited decrease of the PRSI contributory rate for 
employees. Policy changes affecting the expenditure dimension included moderate 
increases of social insurance benefits and social welfare assistance. However, in most 
categories these increases were just enough to cover for the generally increasing costs of 
living and the persistently high inflation. Positive effects for labor market ‗outsiders‘ were 
marginal. The raise in benefits offered by the government hardly covered the increasing 
costs of living, a fact that has been widely criticized by the labor unions and even more so by 
the INOU (Irish National Organization of the Unemployed) and CORI (Conference of 
Religious Ireland). They made clear that the benefits offered to their clientele (mainly 
‗insiders‘) in this package were close to the minimum that they would accept. However, in a 
setting where institutional constraints are low, governments do not need to accommodate the 
‗insiders‘ and conservative government put little emphasis on improving the situation of 
‗outsiders‘. 
Mediating Effects of Political Constraints 
Despite the relatively good economic conditions, labor unions became more critical towards 
the tripartite partnership agreements. After years of wage restraints in some (mostly the 
manufacturing) sector, the labor unions expected that their constituencies were rewarded 
and finally received more generous benefits in the wake of the economic boom. The 
government saved the partnership agreement by accommodating the unionized ‗insiders‘ 
and employers with a pay review and generous tax cuts. Labor market ‗outsiders‘ were put 
off with a minimal increase in welfare benefits. This confirms the theoretical assumptions as 
the economic situation would have allowed for a more egalitarian reform, but the center-right 
government was not much interested in such a more balanced reform. 
Even though the formal institutional setting did not change between 1996 and 2001, the de 
facto political constraints that the two governments faced have slightly changed. In particular, 
the government by Fianna Fàil and Progressive Democrats had to accommodate organized 
interests to save the social partnership agreement as ICTU and other volunteer 
organizations implicitly threatened to leave the ‗Programme for Prosperity and Fairness‘. The 
threat was credible because the power balance between the actors negotiating the 
partnership programme has shifted. Whereas in the beginning, when the government 
initiated the partnership programmes, the three participating groups had similar interests and 
depended on each other, the power balance had shifted towards organized labor in 2001. 
Due to near full employment and even a possible shortage of labor supply, the unions had 
greater bargaining power than in 1996 when unemployment still was high. This political 
constellation was mainly in favor of ‗insiders‘ and at the disadvantage of societal groups that 
– unlike peak-labor unions and employer organizations – were not as important for future 
tripartite agreements. 
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Despite these shifts in the relative political power of the incumbent and the positive economic 
performance, the 2001 reform documents how the focus of a liberal conservative 
government regarding social policy reforms and the economy differ from a social democratic 
government. The needs of labor market ‗outsiders‘ and people in atypical employment 
relations were not addressed by the government despite the fact that income inequality and 
the low wage sector in Ireland (which mostly hired unskilled people) was significantly 
increasing during this period. The pattern of the redistributive generosity of the core welfare 
state programs thus did not change considerably and it mainly helped the well-organized 
insiders for reasons discussed in the previous paragraphs. Moreover, the Social Welfare and 
Financial Bill 2001 led to considerably lower social spending, which continuously fell under 
the conservative incumbency, from 11.5 percent of GDP when the government took office to 
around 7 percent in 2001 (see parliamentary minutes, 07.12.2001). 
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Conclusion 
This study has examined the mediating impact of party governments and political constraints 
on social policy reforms. In particular, I assess labor market policymaking in two countries 
with varying levels of institutional constraints, Ireland and Germany, under each, a left-wing 
and a conservative party government. Whereas in Germany, the social democratic 
government had to accommodate the opposition in the upper chamber of parliament and 
compensate organized interests (mainly labor unions), the conservative government ‗only‘ 
had to consider the social democratic majority in the second chamber of parliament. Both 
governments, however, were unable to design encompassing labor market reforms and both 
governments in the end privileged labor market ‗insiders‘ over ‗labor market‘ outsiders de- 
spite the stated aim to re-integrate long-term unemployed and increase overall labor market 
participation. 
In Ireland, the ‗rainbow coalition‘ government managed to implement a reform that 
predominantly focused on labor market ‗outsiders‘ and aimed at improving their social 
situation. Because of a low level of political constraints, the social welfare minister from the 
Democratic Left was able to implement encompassing social policy reforms that led to an 
increase in overall redistributive generosity and especially targeted the long-term 
unemployed people in society. In contrast, conservative government in Ireland in 2001 faced 
a fairly good economic climate and was not under pressure to cut expenditure. However, 
over all welfare state efforts decreased and wage inequality significantly increased. People 
employed in the low-wage sector were only partly covered by the insurance-based social 
security schemes and the coalition between Fianna Fàil and the Progressive Democrats did 
not significantly improve their situation. The government focused on implementing large tax 
cuts for business and people in high-income brackets. The results of the analysis largely 
confirm the expectations, derived from the theoretical framework and add to the work by 
Rueda (2005; 2007). The result also contradicts the popular wisdom that left-wing parties 
pursue policies that aim at helping the most disadvantaged in society. The joint impact of 
party governments and political constraints works in favor of the core workforce covered by 
insurance based social security schemes and at the expenses of labor market ‗outsiders‘ in 
countries where institutional constraints are high. The results to some extent add to the 
‗paradox of redistribution‘ formulated by Korpi and Palme (1998), but imply that this paradox 
is especially prominent in countries where political constraints are high, such as Germany. 
To further explore the mediating effect between party government and political constraints 
and whether the implications of this effect have changed over the recent decades, evidence 
from a wider range of countries would be helpful. Such an enterprise would benefit from 
more data on social policy decisions in parliaments. The often-used aggregate measures of 
policy change, e.g. data on social spending, are not useful in this context because they also 
reflect developments and changes that are unrelated to partisan choices and only ‗indirectly‘ 
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measure social policy reforms. This study presented a detailed analysis of reform contents 
and processes in different countries with varying levels of constraints. A next step could be to 
collect a more encompassing data set that captures the reform content of such proposals 
and debates in a comparative perspective. Such data of social policy reforms/welfare state 
change would help to better explore how politics influence social policies in post-industrial 
democracies. 
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